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The Geopolitics of the Eastern Border of the European Union: The Case of Romania-Moldova-Ukraine

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Since the fall of the communist regimes, we have been witnessing in Europe two phenomena that dominate the geopolitical scene: on the one hand there is integration, with the advance of the borders of the European Union (EU) towards the east through its two enlargements, and on the other hand there is disintegration, as expressed by social crisis, and latent tensions and conflicts in the countries found beyond the said border. This article focuses on the geopolitical changes that came about on the eastern border of Europe (Romania-Moldova-Ukraine) and the border relations between these three countries after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the integration of Romania into the EU. This is both a multidimensional and ethno-territorial border, associated with tensions and conflict.¹ Using the territorial dialectic of the globalisation argument, we are able to analyse, describe and interpret from a theoretical-empirical standpoint, the two current discussions about that border: opening by means of cooperation, or closing by means of control and security.

INTRODUCTION

The borders of Eastern Europe have undergone fundamental changes since the fall of the Berlin Wall and their continual movement and advancement has brought about change to the geopolitical map of Europe.² During the 1990s, the thorny problem of borders acquired a new dimension. The rigid practices of the nation-state were exhausted and were transformed because

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of numerous transnational flows, cooperation, and changing social practices.³ Therefore, since its creation, the European project configured the border as a barrier, bridge or symbol of identity,⁴ and began to examine it from the standpoint of European integration, migration policy,⁵ problems with the development of international communication, and the evaluation of risks that result from the current statute of state borders.⁶

The border issue returned to the centre stage of debate in Europe chiefly after 2004 and upon the first enlargement of the EU that encompassed countries of Central and Eastern Europe, followed in 2007 by the addition of Romania and Bulgaria. But the study of borders has undergone a renaissance during the past decade⁷ and moved beyond the limited confines of political geography discourse, crossing its own disciplinary boundaries to include sociologists and political scientists.⁸ Examined and debated especially from the point of view of history and international relations, the analysis of border provides a very rich field for geopolitical expression in the area of Eastern Europe. There were numerous analysts and specialists⁹ who from various terminologies, ideological viewpoints¹⁰ and scientific goals¹¹ analysed Europe's borders with special reference to Central and Eastern Europe.¹² Nevertheless, the specific area studied here, formed of the risky and convoluted cultural, ethnic and political labyrinth and laboratory that is Eastern Europe, was forged under great trauma and difficulties throughout history, and has been little noted by geopolitical studies.

This article analyses the border situated between Romania, Moldova and Ukraine. It tries to provide an introduction to the universe that links identity and region, present along the border between the three states.

I consider borders in the broadest sense, that is, as both literal borders and conceptual boundaries.¹³ My attention is focused on the transformation of the territorial line, *boundary*, into a global border, understood as a more complex mode, taking into consideration authors such as Van Houtoum,¹⁴ who explains "border" as a multidimensional place in which socio-spatial differences and interactions are communicated. This, then, is an example of where two current tendencies are seen throughout the World: opening and closing.

The study offers an analysis of an original European border, which plays the role of a bridge/barrier between two distinct geopolitical projects: the Euro-Atlantic (EU and US) and the Euro-Asiatic (Russia). The first part, analyses the concept of border and boundaries, as applied to the region studied, while it also takes a look at the identity of the three countries making up that border. The following parts analyse complex border development, which includes legal aspects of delimitation and demarcation, security, border control and cooperation, with the creation of cooperation networks and the interpreting of the current border as a borderland: a large Geographic territorial place that encompasses the border area. The conclusions

provide an invitation to open up discussions on borders in the twenty-first century in a region whose cultural border configuration, while apparently peripherals, is situated in reality within the non-territorial grammar of modernity.

BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES IN EASTERN EUROPE

One of the most sensitive points on the geopolitical-symbolic map of border relations in Eastern Europe is that of Romania-Moldova-Ukraine. Upon a reading of the fascinating text by Van Houtoum, which has as points of departure such classics as Julian Minghi¹⁵ and Victor Prescott,¹⁶ I consider that an analysis of Europe's Eastern border would be an aid to understanding studies on boundaries (understood as limits) and studies on borders (the border construct as a social reality). We are situated in the structure of a border society, in a historical context, to observe the evolution and direction of turbulence on a border which is, according to Kymlicka,¹⁷ currently considered by politicians and citizens of the Member States as the last border of Europe. It is "last" for now, given that the European project that began with the 1957 Treaty of Rome has undergone several amplifications. The enlargement of 2007 will not be the last, given that bordering countries Moldova and Ukraine are knocking at the EU's door. Moldova has signed the Association Accord with the EU, while Ukraine has joined the European Neighbourhood and is negotiating a treaty of Association with the EU, which is the ante-chamber of integration.

Romania, Moldova and Ukraine are, thus, a region of multiple borders and boundaries which delimit what is to be included and excluded.

Thus, borderlands represent a juncture between the literal and conceptual borders.¹⁸ In fact, an important theme of the article is that in order to understand this particular borderland region, we need to look at literal border and conceptual boundaries as complementary processes that sometimes reinforce each other, sometimes subvert each other.

Underlying this focus on the complementary relationship between literal borders and conceptual boundaries is the recognition that such places are always areas of contested power,¹⁹ a point highlighted by the changing configuration of both borders and boundaries between Romania-Moldova-Ukraine. While it is clear that literal borders have changed over time, as various powers exerting influence over the area have either expanded or contracted their spheres of influence, conceptual boundaries based on ethnicity and shared history, have remained more constant (although they too have changed). What is required in the future is an exploration of how the construction and dismantling of state borders intersects with the formation and dissolving of conceptual boundaries. The aims of this article are more modest. It suggests that both boundaries and borders are being re-valued and

used as a resource, particularly in times of economic uncertainty. Political and economic reform across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was accompanied by the dismantling versus establishing of borders and the emergence of new nation-states. The internal border became an international border after 1991, following proclamations of independence by Moldova and Ukraine. At the same time, the strictly regulated border in the west established in 1944 between Romania and the Soviet Union was relaxed after 1989, but is being reinforced again with the admittance of Romania to the European Union.

While the rise of new borders and nation-states are changes to be reckoned with in the region, this article also considers other boundaries that prove equally significant: boundaries of a historical, ethnic or security nature, which delineate the area along different configurations. The cross-cutting of political borders and ethnic boundaries results in a shifting map of spaces and identities.

The analysis, then, is a combination of an initial “good border”, *correct*, (Rechtsgrenzen), which is to say natural (as visualised by Houtoum and inspired by the classics of border studies), and the “bad border”, *incorrect* (Schlechthegrenzen)²⁰ – which is human and political and which is created and re-created by history and politics. When the existence of a bad border disturbs or does not coincide with boundaries, the states implicated suffer aggression at the political-spiritual level, and factors such as identity, political and legal elements, as well as symbolic elements are affected. The border as symbolic space is then “the third space” local and/or global that unites and divides simultaneously.²¹

This is therefore a multidimensional border²² of a space needed for “security in society”,²³ in which, identity, migration and border access are beginning to underlie the perception of threats and vulnerability.²⁴ In this situation of three countries sharing a common border, I shall analyse as follows.

First, Romania, on the prosperous fringe, is in a difficult position being at the crossroads linking Eastern and Western Europe and Northern and Southern Asia. It is a state that serves as a lid, a position that defines the condition of small states that find themselves in between larger powers, which explains the so-called lid policy.²⁵ Since the 1990s, it has been a country of emigration²⁶ that has had to overcome a number of obstacles on the democratic path and development towards European and Atlantic structures.²⁷ Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU in 2007, becoming the last, or the new, eastern border and reinforcing its geopolitical configuration. It had to adapt its border interests to those of the EU (Figure 1) and to its new condition as a community country, and witnessed an increase in tensions already experienced with Moldova, a region historically, ethnically and culturally Romanian on the other side of the Prut River.²⁸




FIGURE 1 Romania, a year after joining the European Union. Border reforms and activities. Source: Author's own conception, based on information from the 2007 Annual Activity Evaluation Report, Romanian Border Police.

Secondly, Moldova, brother country of the east, is a crucible of ethnicities (Table 1) and an area devastated by history²⁹ that is in a difficult geopolitical situation. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Russians who lived in the eastern sector founded, at the natural boundary formed by the Dniester River, the Pridnestrovian Moldovan Republic (Transdnistria) without recognising the authority of Chisinau. The region has become, over the last two

TABLE 1 Make-Up of Moldova Population (2008)

Ethnicities	Thousands of persons	% Of the total
Moldovans	2794,7	64,5
Ukrainians	600,4	13,8
Russians	562,1	13,0
Gagauzians	153,5	3,5
Bulgarians	88,4	2,0
Jews	65,8	1,5
Byelorussians	19,6	0,5
Germans	7,3	0,2
Roma	11,6	0,3
Poles	4,7	0,1
Others	27,3	0,6
Total Population	4335.4	100.0

Source: The latest census, 1989; Chisinau, Population and demographic processes in the Republic of Moldova (1995) p. 21. National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova.

decades, a shelter for human trafficking, arms and drug smuggling, as well as transnational criminal organisations.³⁰

Moldova is, then, a key for entering Europe. Taking into consideration the geopolitical processes that explode unexpectedly, as well as the status of uncertainty that predominates in the area once occupied by the Soviet Union (called a “black hole” by Zbigniew Brzezinski³¹), the most important issues for interaction between Romania and Moldova are, on the one hand, the creation of a Moldovan identity (language and religion) and, on the other, the lack of security in the region of Bessarabia-Transdnistria, which becomes ever more evident with the coming of Euro-Atlantic structures to the eastern border of Europe.

Finally, Ukraine, a strategic country, is situated on the pathways of energy transfer and is an extraordinarily complex state that wants to be recognised as a large power. But political and economic instability, on one hand, and energy dependence on Russia, on the other, make it difficult for Ukraine to reach the levers of power for now. Besides the Russian fleet in the Crimea, where 90% of the population is Russian, there is tension with regard to the future of Ukraine being with the East (poor, traditional and Orthodox Christian) or with the West (more developed, Greek and Catholic).³² Even though it fervently wants to be integrated into Western structures,³³ in its relations with Romania and Moldova it exercises justified pressures on the territories that these States have in their power, which strains relations, while making continuous regional threats.

IDENTITY AND BORDER CONSTRUCTION IN EASTERN EUROPE THE MOLDOVAN QUESTION AND THE ROMANIANS OF UKRAINE

Let us begin by reflecting on the past. The sixth of May 1990 was an important day in the history of the Romanians of Romania and Moldova. After 50 years of the vagaries of the natural border, the River Prut, hundreds of thousands of Romanians of Romania and Moldova faced each other from opposite banks of the river.³⁴ (See Figure 2.) History and cultural and linguistic identity go hand in hand to explain the wish the two countries had for union after the independence of Moldova. The symbols of this wish were the flower bridges thrown across the River Prut that marked the re-encounter of the two peoples.

But the recent history of European integration and the development of bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova turned the initial bridge for which the people of the border region of the two countries had so desired into a barrier. The convoluted history of the Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan borderland is not unusual. But there is an additional twist to the Ukrainian-Romanian-Moldovan story: the question of Moldovan and Romanian identities in Ukraine.




FIGURE 2 Border crossing.

Precisely because of the peripheral character of the region, which is at the margins of the former Ottoman and Russian Empires and at a crossroads which frequently transformed the area into a battlefield, the area attracted those seeking religious and ethnic freedom.

For much of the twentieth century, the relationship between Romania and Moldova was a significant issue in terms of both domestic politics and foreign policy. Romance-speaking inhabitants of Bessarabia, separated from a Romanian political entity after 1812, continued to use the label “Moldovan” to describe their language and culture; since they had been politically separated from the rest of the Romanian cultural space before the development of a solid Romanian national identity, their conceptions of community remained largely as they had been in the early nineteenth century. Even when the Bessarabians found themselves inside Greater Romania, the use of the term “Moldovan” and a solid sense of regional identity among the Bessarabians confounded attempts to create a strong, pan-Romanian culture throughout the state.³⁵ Soviet diplomats and cultural planners used this proto-national sentiment among the Moldovans to their own ends. Between the World Wars, the Soviets consistently argued that the Moldovans were culturally and linguistically separate from the Romanians. Moscow’s territorial claims on Bessarabia were packaged not as irredentism but as a form of national liberation for the oppressed Moldovan masses, who were suffering at the hands of Romanian assimilationists.³⁶ After 1940, the idea of Moldovan

separateness remained central to Soviet cultural policy. The Moldovan language, written in the Cyrillic script, was held to be separate from Romanian, even though there were virtually no grammatical distinctions and very few lexical differences by the 1980s. The history of the Moldovans was held to be distinct from that of the Romanians, largely because of the annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian empire and the increased links between Moldovan and Russian culture that this afforded.³⁷

At present, the majority of Moldovans consider themselves to be Romanians living in a second Romanian state. In contrast to Romanians in Ukraine, who consider themselves a separate ethnic minority living in the Ukraine, Moldovans constitute the titular majority nation in the Republic of Moldova, and are not seen as a 'minority' in Romania, but as a component of the single nation. However, while some Moldovans see their separate statehood as a temporary anomaly and expect eventual reunification with Romania, others (along with Moldova's minorities of Slavs and Gagauzs) are committed to maintaining a separate state. Moreover, as many as half a million (20%) Moldovans have availed themselves of the right to obtain Romanian passports.

The shared border of Romania and Ukraine is the result of what was imposed by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact³⁸ that into present-day Ukraine incorporated the Romanian territories of Northern Bucovina, the regions of Herta and southern Bessarabia and Snake Island and numerous small islands in the Chilia Branch of the Danube Delta. Currently, therefore, significant Romanian communities in Ukraine are "de-nationalized" both culturally and socially.³⁹ It is therefore a border of identity, of walls and blurry horizons, of encounters and separations.

According to the 1989 Soviet census (still the most reliable baseline estimate of ethnic populations in the former Soviet Union), there were 134,825 Romanians and 324,525 Moldovans in Ukraine, a total Romanian-speaking population that accounted for 0.9% of Ukraine's total. Most of these groups lived in western Ukraine along the borders of Romania and Moldova, with smaller settlements scattered in Trans-Carpathia and between the Dniester and Dnepr rivers. Their main areas of settlement – the historical regions of northern Bukovina, today in Chernauti oblast, and southern Bessarabia, now in Odessa oblast – were part of the kingdom of Romania between the two world wars. Their annexation by the Soviet Union in 1940 and the subsequent apportionment to the Ukrainian SSR left substantial Romanian-speaking populations outside the Romanian state and set up a potential irredentist.

The tortuous history of the Romanian, Ukrainian, and Moldovan borderland over the last two centuries has created a host of conflicting claims on land and has injected questions of identity and nationality into international politics. There is little about the history of this zone that is uncontroversial. The status of Romanians inside Ukraine and how they relate to the

Moldovans, and the role of the Romanian state in looking out for their interests, were important issues for much of the last century. Although these issues have not led to international confrontation or even localised violence, they are part of the context of interstate relations between Bucharest and Kiev.

At the same time, minority status grants the Moldovans in Ukraine, the Ukrainians in Moldova, the Romanians in Ukraine, and the Ukrainians in Romania amongst others, special access and claims to their historical 'homelands'. The much smaller Ukrainian community in Romania, about 66,000 in 1992 (1% of the population), has not normally been a major concern (although reciprocity in diplomacy demands that the rights of Ukrainians in Romania are always mentioned in the same breath as the rights of Romanians in Ukraine).⁴⁰

Here I find it useful to draw on Brubaker (1996)⁴¹ who identifies three important factors at play in Eastern European nationalisms: the 'nationalising state' (the aim of which is to build a nation-state and state loyalties), 'national minorities populations' (which are historically situated on the territory of the nationalising state but do not belong to the majority ethnic group) and 'national homelands' (neighbouring countries to which national minorities could refer as 'their' nation-state). National minorities can "alleviate" the pressure (for example, of linguistic homogenisation) coming from the nationalising state by maintaining their links with their homeland. The dynamics between these three factors determines the shape of most nationalist manifestations in the border of Eastern Europe.

BORDERLINES AND RELATIONS OF POWER

In both past and present border demarcations, it is the nature of the power relations that remains a key factor.⁴² Thus, borders are more than just physical lines.⁴³ New approaches in Political Geography and International Relations have instead proposed to study borders as socially constructed institutions.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, the course of these lines is important to our understanding of how boundaries affect the nature of interaction, cooperation and/or conflict between peoples.⁴⁵

In international law, the concept of 'limit' refers to a line that divides a territorial sphere from the jurisdiction of the State. The organisation of borders (including the case of the transformation of borders from administrative to international ones) has two stages: delimitation and demarcation. The two are part of the complex system of actions and measures that organise a border as an institution. Consequently, until a demarcation has taken place we cannot speak about the exact location of where the border of a State passes.

The delimitation of a border, which by nature is a political process, implies bilateral negotiations to determine the line formed by a border on

maps. These frequently involve the objectives of the efficient management of borders. In this process, the states involved adopt, according to their interests, the border line which assures the functionality of certain public objectives, and moreover, assures a more efficient control over the border.

On the one hand, the border between the Moldovan-Romanian States was defined according to demarcation documents of 1948, but Moldova, being subject to international law, was created after the proclamation of her independence in August 1991. The border points, their functionality regime, the transit of travellers, the organisation of the interaction of border safe-guards and border controls, were jointly agreed upon.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, no treaty for bilateral cooperation and friendship has been signed by the two countries.⁴⁷

On the other hand, the agreement on the interstate border between Ukraine and Moldova was signed in 1999 and ratified in June 2001 simultaneously along with additional protocol, after long debates in Moldova, which proves an essential lack of consensus in Moldovan society on this issue. Under this agreement, Moldova transferred to Ukraine part of a road from Odessa to Reni near the village of Palanka in exchange for Ukraine's commitment to provide for Moldova with a part of territory ensuring Moldova's access to the Danube riverbank. This decision raised protests from the Palanka residents, supported also by Moldovan right-wing opposition parties. After ratification, a joint demarcation commission was formed that completed its first organisational meeting in Cernauti by reaching a decision on the beginning of concrete steps on demarcation and the establishment of check points.⁴⁸

Despite formal completion of the deal, which can formally be regarded as positive, a lack of proper information campaigns to justify such kinds of decisions and gain public support for them, may incite an additional mistrust in the relationship between the two nations.⁴⁹ There were indications of certain aggravation of the already existing Moldovian suspicions of what had been perceived as Ukrainian selfishness and even potential aggressiveness, marring the prospects of further mutual support and friendship on the hard road to democracy and European integration.

Another essential problem is the non-desire of Transdnistria representatives to take part in the delimitation process: they have withdrawn their representatives from the delimitation committee and are still sabotaging the works and attempts to organise the border.

Demarcation is a technical process that consists of marking the border, placing border columns on the territory (which is to overlay maps over the earth). With demarcation, the criteria for inclusion/exclusion are determined.⁵⁰ In the case of Moldova and Ukraine, since there is no natural border the matter became much more difficult. This is an institutional border,⁵¹ a "settled boundary"⁵² by which political power is expressed. We can see, therefore, that with this demarcation, we have the construction of a border of

power, of exclusion and inclusion that is permeable according to interests. The criteria that determine how and where this border is to be constructed in society and/or in space are determined by political power.

The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine started the process of demarcation, with this occasion, and congratulated each other, on being the only Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) states to begin the transformation of the administrative post-Soviet border into international ones.

In 2003, the parties started the process of border demarcation talks and two years later (2005) signed an agreement on border demarcation. At present there are two obstacles slowing this process down, namely: a lack of funds and the Transdnistria issue. Almost half of the Ukraine-Moldova border is under the control of the Tiraspol separatist regime. This part of the border is probably the most criminalised one in Eastern Europe.

But besides the objective difficulties passed down by the Russian imperial and Soviet policies that traced and re-drew these borders, there also exist subjective factors that have become symbols of a lack of confidence and communication between the countries involved in the question of the Eastern border. These factors, which are truly glass barriers, put the brakes on border activity and affect the geopolitics of the region.

Furthermore, the Eastern border is confronted with geopolitical fragmentation due to the dramatic and precarious political and socio-economic situation of Eastern Europe beyond the borders of the EU.

The geopolitical border tension existing between the countries is reflected in the contentious debate over Snake Island (Șerpilor)⁵³ in the Black Sea, a rocky islet located 37 kilometres from the Danube Delta. The status of Snake Island, which was transferred to the USSR by Romania in 1947 for use as a military base, presents a particular and relatively intractable problem in Romanian-Ukrainian border relations. Otherwise relatively useless, the tiny island has taken on significant strategic importance because of its role in delimiting the maritime boundary between the two countries, and because of potential oil and natural gas resources beneath the Black Sea. With up to 2,800 square miles of territory potentially in dispute, the economic consequences of title are thus substantial. Following Ukraine's independence, contention over Snake Island was immediately transferred from Moscow to Kiev. On the administrative plane, the Island is part of the region of Odessa. The matter thenceforth was a continual obstacle to completion of a bilateral treaty. The significance of the issue for both sides was indicted by the fact that by 1996 Ukraine had reached bilateral friendship agreements with all of its neighbours except Romania and Russia, despite the fact that all had potential territorial claims against it.⁵⁴

For its specifics, the problem belongs to the area of international law and there is indeed ongoing litigation by the two countries before the International Court of The Hague. According to the rule of the Convention on Maritime Law, the island is a rock that Ukraine insists is inhabitable.⁵⁵ If to

this we add the construction of the Bâstroe Canal⁵⁶ in the Danube Delta, tensions are increased.

It is clear that in this legal process there are winners and losers in the struggle of interests over territory. These lead one to the classic theory referring to Eastern Europe that has gained increasing relevance in recent years. In 1904⁵⁷, 1919⁵⁸ and 1943⁵⁹, Halford Mackinder formulated, articulated and reworked his theory of the heartland, according to which those who possess Eastern Europe have dominion over Eurasia, Africa, and, as a consequence, over the whole world. It was thus that a uni-polar view started which in 1945 became the multi-polarity that dominated the world until the end of 1989. To this theory are linked the tensions and conflict located along the border of the East of Europe.

ARE BORDERS CLOSING IN EASTERN EUROPE?

“If a border exists, there is always someone who will cross it to get to the other side”.⁶⁰ This realist reflection by Newman illustrates that crossing borders has become an increasingly frequent phenomenon. In this case, the enlargement of the EU invariably transformed the border into a dynamic and elastic phenomenon. Throughout this process, border discipline established a temporal and spatial distance between “us” and “them”.⁶¹ As a consequence, the bridge feeling is manifested only in the cases of Member countries of the EU. For the “others”, the border is a barrier, a violent process of exclusion,⁶² expressed by the reinforcement of border security. Nevertheless, with the advance of EU borders, that which had been kept at a distance has now become closer; what was external has become inescapably internal despite the “oppressive desire for protection”,⁶³ the walls that divide the centre from the periphery, the illegal alien from the citizen of Europe.

Because of their geopolitical position and economic and social conditions, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine are countries of origin and transit of illegal migration. Since 2007, Romania has been the institutional East border of the EU, being one of the most ample outside borders: 2,070 kilometres of the EU external border are found in Romania.

It should be noted that, with the slow advance of European enlargement, illegal immigration and its routes are ever growing. It is important to point out the existing difficulty in measuring the number of illegal immigrants that attempt to cross the Eastern border into the EU. Authors⁶⁴ reflect in their studies on the scientific difficulty of building statistics: the real measures of immigrants who currently cross the borders of the world. Generally, illegal migrants cross borders in various ways: the green zone, railways, highways, airports and naval and maritime borders.⁶⁵ (See Figure 3.) The Romanian Border Police⁶⁶ has identified the following immigration




FIGURE 3 Sites of border arrests Romania–Moldova, 2005–2007.

Source: Author's concept, based on Romania Border Police report, 2008, available at <www.politiadefrontera.ro>.




FIGURE 4 Afro-Asian route migration.

routes leading from Africa, Asia and the countries of the former USSR into Romania (Figure 4).

The greatest difficulties are found along the border situated between Moldova and Romania (Table 2). At these crossing points, border controls

TABLE 2 Crossing Border Moldova–Romania: 2001/2007

Point	Year 2000/ number of persons	Year 2007/ number of persons
Albita – Leuseni	535,366	542,907
Falciu – Stoianovca	40,281	80,491
Galati – Giurgiulesti	399,416	500,231
Iasi – Ungheni	654,187	560,869
Oancea – Cahul	367,678	405,392
Sculeni – Sculeni	730,517	937,405
Stinca – Costesti	291,222	537,442
Total	3,018.667	3,564,737

Source: Iasi Border Police, Romania, 2008.

have not eliminated the increase in cross-border human trafficking, or the crossing of stolen automobiles, weapons, and money.

There are many border management issues to be improved, such as the harmonisation of practices, better cooperation and a better exchange of information between the border authorities of these two countries. There are two important fibre-optic connections between Moldova and Romania. Both countries are currently discussing the measures to be taken in order to reach an efficient control of the border. In order to secure the Romanian-Moldovan border several checking procedures are already planned or are being tried out by the Republic of Moldova and by Romania.

Since 2007, after the entry of Romania to the EU, citizens of Moldova are required to obtain a visa to enter Romania, and the border between the two countries has become a border of the EU, re-opening old and serious wounds among the citizens of Moldova and between the two governments. Thus a fracture in the cultural space that had been consolidated throughout history was created.

The main difficulties related to the crossing of the border between Moldova and Romania concern the existing legislation, the infrastructure and equipment available, the organisation, the degree of computerisation, staff training and inter-institutional co-operation.

1. At the legislative level, important gaps were recorded in the Romanian–Moldovan co-operation. The legislative framework of the two countries concerning the control of the border is still not harmonised and there is not yet a border treaty between the two countries,⁶⁷ whilst certain existing agreements between Romania and Moldova have not yet been applied.
2. The Border Guards Department in Moldova did not sign any agreement with the Romanian Border Police regarding the exchange of information in the sphere of border security.

3. The techniques of joint control are only in their beginnings and border traffic is not sufficiently fluid because of the insufficiency of existing crossing points.
4. In general, several administrative measures and techniques related to the management of the Romanian-Moldovan border remain at the declaratory level without being applied.

The Romania-Moldova-Ukraine border policy can be found within the framework of the internal and justice policies of the EU, as represented by the Schengen Convention.⁶⁸ Before its entry into the EU, Romania had to adjust its border policies to those of Europe. For this, it was essential to stop illegal migration and trafficking in Romania.

To achieve this goal, labour and re-entry accords were signed with countries of the EU.⁶⁹ Upon achieving independence, Moldovans, as well as Ukrainians and ethnic Romanians requested Romanian citizenship (Table 3).

As of 2005, the border crossings between Ukraine and Moldova are possible only on the basis of national passports. The border with Ukraine is very badly organised and is extremely transparent. Taking into consideration that the borders of Ukraine with Russia and Belarus are also transparent, this means that people and goods from the CIS may cross the eastern border of the Republic of Moldova practically without control. The lack of authority of the Moldovan Government over a vast stretch of its external border with Ukraine leaves about 421 km uncontrolled and in effect open. This is the sieve allowing transit through the independent region of Transnistria that, while it does have checkpoints, does not have border control. This favours smuggling, illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, drugs and arms traffic. At the international border crossing at Khristovaya (between Ukraine and Transnistria), there has been an EU Border Assistance Mission since 2005. Its common goal is to promote transparency and stability in the region.

TABLE 3 Citizens of Moldova and Ukraine Who Received Romanian Citizenship (1991–2007)

Year	Moldova	Ukraine
1991–2001	94.916	3.371
2002	0	0
2003	6	0
2004	257	5
2005	1317	11
2006	1500	3387
2007	2500	1890
Total	100.496	8.664

Sources: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Administration and Interior; Ministry of Justice.

In a world characterised by global inequalities that favour the rise in the flow of unregulated migration, the attitude of the EU, unfortunately, has not been favourable, and it has changed its borders into fortresses. I would like to point out the 2008 directive, which was approved without amendment by the European Parliament.⁷⁰ With this directive, the EU does not respect human rights while arming itself with laws and regulations against the homeless who call at its doors at its southern and eastern borders. Border security is a matter of mentality: of opening or closing borders. Strict border control should not retard but should, rather, assure and facilitate good conditions and access to services, goods, and capital. And, moreover, to people. For now, the border system contributes to inequality between the states inside and outside, as well as to the limitations on the mobility of persons originating in eastern countries seeking to enter the EU space.

RE-INTERPRETING THE EASTERN EUROPEAN BORDER: TOWARDS BORDERLAND?

Problems of joint but unrecognised identity, tensions in demarcation, knotty geopolitical problems that remain untied, unregulated traffic, legal vacuums, a lack of communication and silence as an answer. Borders made of thorns, glass or cement. We are situated increasingly in the midst of ubiquitous and multiple borders, which establish unmediated contacts with a European and world border. But the way is very large in this peripheral and marginal region of Europe, because the issue of border adjustment within the European context created after the fall of the USSR was a difficult proposal.

But the border can be reinterpreted by following the dynamic of enlargement through cooperation, between the countries situated on the periphery and those at the heart of Europe. Cooperation between Romania and Moldova, at the official and diplomatic level, continues to be tense. Despite this, there was a qualitative change in bilateral relations between Romania and Moldova, with an increase in recent years of commercial exchanges (Figure 5). Cultural relationships have also prospered. Because of the facilities accorded to citizens of Moldova, a large number of intellectuals of the country have been educated at the universities in Romania over the last 18 years. When the populations on both sides of the border interact through cooperation or exchange, a border is created.⁷¹ All types of cooperation represent the softening of the real human border and the symbolic border between the two countries.

The development of a deep foreign policy relationship between Romania and Ukraine has been conspicuously absent in post-Cold War Eastern Europe – in either a cooperative or a confliction sense. On the one hand, some degree of cooperation between the two states might have been




FIGURE 5 Bilateral commerce Romania–Moldova (US\$ million).

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania, 2008, <www.mae.ro>.

anticipated. Romania is the largest country in the southeast, both in terms of territory and population, and has at various times portrayed itself as a regional leader, a point of union between the EU, the Balkans and Russia. Ukraine is the largest state in the west (CIS) and, in general, has sought ways to underscore its independence from Russian dominance. There is no real history of conflict between Romanians and Ukrainians as national groups. One might therefore have expected some degree of real cross-border cooperation between the two countries. On the other hand, Romania and Ukraine had two major outstanding territorial disputes associated with Romanian lands annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940. Those territories were, moreover, inhabited by significant Romanian minorities, whose status was of some concern to both Romanian politicians and the Romanian public. In 1991, Romania refused to recognise the results of the referendum on the independence of Ukraine in those areas of the territory where ethnic Romanians lived.

The Good Neighbour and Cooperation Treaty signed by Romania and Ukraine⁷² in 1997, was an effort to suppress inter-state tensions between the two countries and confirmed the new changes in the European geopolitical space.

As a result of closer relations over the last few years, there has also been an observable increase in the amount of commercial exchanges between the two countries (Figure 6).

At Ukraine-Romania border checkpoints, one of the goals has been that of improving the fluidity of border traffic, given that as of January 2008 Romanian citizens no longer need a visa to enter Ukraine, while rules regulating visas for Ukrainians have been simplified.⁷³




FIGURE 6 Bilateral commerce Romania–Ukraine (US\$ million).

Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania, 2008, <www.mae.ro>.

The principal barrier on the road to European integration, cooperation and solutions for borders of Ukraine and Moldova is the maintenance of Russia's influence in the region. The situation as a whole implies the necessity of synchronising the integration policies of the regions of Moldova and Transdnistria, and Ukraine as well, with Euro-Atlantic structures.⁷⁴ Moldova and Ukraine signed a "Plan of Action" with the EU in 2005 as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy, looking forward to bilateral dialogue with regard to visa policy. However, the problem of the border demarcation between the two states constitutes one of the most difficult issues in relations between Moldova and Ukraine.⁷⁵ These are constituted by porous borders, characterised by a lack of adequate policy, an absence of related technical material, and a lack of integrity on the part of border personnel to control illegal migration and human trafficking.

The key problem of Ukraine's standpoint vis-à-vis Moldova is that there are some strong business-political groups that are interested in preserving the status quo in Transdnistria in order to continue shadowy businesses. They do not express their position transparently but try to press the government of Ukraine to preserve direct contacts with Transdnistrian regime leaders. Lobbyists for Transdnistria exploit the issue of Ukrainian minority in that region of Moldova to get some public legitimacy for this policy inside Ukraine. As a consequence, Ukraine's border policy remained ambivalent and contradictory, while undermining trust between Kiev and Chisinau without any real benefits for both.

In order to resolve the border turbulence and strengthen cooperation between Romania, Moldova, and Ukraine, the following Euro-regions⁷⁶

were created: Prutul de Sus⁷⁷ (Upper Prut), and Dunărea de Jos⁷⁸ (Lower Danube).

The reason for the Romanian party initiating the establishment of two Euro-regions into the base of the Ukrainian–Romanian political agreement was rather interesting and unusual. Proceeding from the fact that a large Romanian ethnic group lives in Ukraine, Romanian diplomats decided to use the institution of Euro-regions as the means of protecting the rights of Romanian Diaspora representatives.

Cooperation within the framework of the Euro-regions is focused on carrying out projects and programmes along the lines of simplifying the procedures for transiting state borders and customs controls for citizens and economic agents who pass through the region. The activity of the Euro-regions also focuses on the realisation of trilateral meetings and coordination in the field of environmental protection, the arrangement of new international border crossing points, the search for financing joint projects, as well as the creation of measures to combat organised crime, terrorism, illegal arms traffic, prohibited substances, immigration and illegal border traffic.

Following initiatives in cooperation, the EU established the Operational Programme (2007–2013) for cross-border cooperation within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which offers possibilities for countries on the Eastern border to participate in community projects through political, cultural, and security cooperation. A potential global interpretation of this development suggests the relevance of considering Europe, in the future, in terms of a borderland.⁷⁹ The significance of borderland as transition zone⁸⁰ (cultural, linguistic and social) is that it captures much of the reality of East European borders, where inside and outside are not easily separated and where the border is being reconstituted in numerous ways. The borderland invokes the move towards a network conception of space, which is relevant to the current dynamic of Europeanisation and its interface with globalisation.

CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS A BORDER DIALOGUE

We live in an era of borders but also of movement: a time of free circulation of merchandise, capital services and people; a time of borders and immigration. The border advances, but it does so with clear laws. In this case, it separates the EU from the rest of the countries of Europe but also two nations, Romania and Moldova, which are linked historically and ethnically by the same identity and language.

In this article, I have analysed the multidimensional border of Eastern Europe, which divides/unites Romania, Moldova and Ukraine, within the boundary/border/borderland equation. Following the most recent enlargement of the EU, the Schengen border falls through this region and confers upon it an importance which it did not have until now. Therefore, it is

appropriate to recognise the events that occur along this border that is situated, despite its geographic periphery, in the worldwide geopolitical debate.

The lack of involvement of the EU until recently has meant the creation of different worlds separated by a bad border that is fed by a lack of security and corruption. It is precisely the enlargement of the EU and the integration of Romania and its structures that has contributed to the separation of citizens beyond its Eastern border. The visa requirement for Moldovans should not imply the adoption of measures that are contradictory to freedom of movement and human rights.

Seeing it from this perspective, it is time for the EU states to start showing solidarity on the issue of immigration management by means of burden-sharing. The complexity of the Eastern border which has come about because of the combination of forces that cohabit there, presents themes for dialogue among analysts and scholars, who from various multi-disciplinary approaches and while using the theoretical richness of border language, can serve to create a synergistic debate about the region.

NOTES

1. D. Newman, 'Conflict at the Interface: The Impact of Boundaries and Borders on Contemporary Ethno-National Conflict', in C. Flint (ed.), *Geographies of War and Conflict* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004) pp. 321–345; G. Blake, 'State Limits in the Early 21st Century: Observations on Form and Function', *Geopolitics* 5/1 (2000) pp. 1–18; S. Ratner, 'Drawing a Better Line: *Utī Possidetis* and the Borders of New States', *American Journal of International Law* 90/4 (1996) pp. 590–624; S. Waterman, 'Boundaries and the Changing World Political Order', in Clive Schofield (ed.), *World Boundaries*, Vol. I, *Global Boundaries* (London: Routledge, 1994).

2. S. Moisisio, 'Redrawing the Map of Europe: Spatial Formation of the EU's Eastern Dimension', *Geography Compass* 1/1 (2007) pp. 82–102.

3. J. Agnew, S. Corbridge, 'Mastering Space, Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy' (London and New York: Routledge 1996); G. Blake and M. Pratt, *International Boundaries and Environmental Security Frameworks for Regional Cooperation* (London: Kluwer Law International 1997); A. Passi, 'Boundaries as Social Processes: Territoriality in the World of Flows', *Geopolitics* 3 (1998) pp. 69–88.

4. L. O'Dowd, 'The Changing Significance of European Borders', *Regional and Federal Studies* 12/4 (2002) pp. 13–36.

5. R. Miles and D. Thrahardt, *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter Publishers 1995); G. Lahav, 'Immigration and the State: The Devolution and Privatization of Immigration Control in the EU', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 24/1 (1998) pp. 675–94; M. Ugur, 'Freedom of Movement Versus Exclusion: a Reinterpretation of the "Insider"–"Outsiders" Divide in the European Union', *International Migration Review* 29 (1995) pp. 964–999.

6. J. Anderson and L. O'Dowd, 'Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Chancing Significance', *Regional Studies*, Special Issue on 'State Borders and Border Regions' 33/7 (1999) pp. 593–604; W. Walters, 'The Frontiers of the European Union: A Geostrategic Perspective', *Geopolitics* 9/3 (Autumn 2004) pp. 674–649.

7. D. Newman and A. Paasi, 'Fences and Neighbours in the Post-Modern World: Boundary Narratives in Political Geography', *Progress in Human Geography* 22/2 (1998) pp. 186–207; E. Berg and E. Van Houtum (eds.), *Routing Borders Between Territories, Discourse and Practices* (Aldershot: Ashgate 2004); H. Eskelinen, I. Liikanene, and J. Oksa (eds.), *Curtains of Iron and Gold: Reconstructing Borders and Scales of Interaction* (Aldershot: Ashgate 1999).

8. D. Newman, 'The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our 'Borderless' World', *Progress in Human Geography Lecture* 30/2 (2006) pp. 143–161.

9. H. Van Houtum, 'The Geopolitics of Borders and Boundaries', *Geopolitics* 10 (2005) pp. 672–679; D. Newman, 'Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue', *European Journal of Social Theory* 9/2 (2006) pp. 171–186. V. Kolossov, 'Theorizing Borders. Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches', *Geopolitics* 10 (2005) pp. 606–632; M. Foucher, 'The Geopolitics of European Frontiers', M. Anderson and Bort (eds.), *The Frontiers of Europe* (London: Pinter 1998) pp. 235–250; J. Agnew, 'Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity, and Movement in World Politics', *Millennium* 28/3 (1999) pp. 499–521; E. Brunnet-Jailly, 'Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective', *Geopolitics* 10 (2005) pp. 633–644; T. Forsberg, 'The Ground Without Foundation? Territory as a Social Construct', *Geopolitics* 8/2 (2003) pp. 7–24.

10. Determinism, geodeterminism, positivism (Maull), relativism (Paasi), pragmatism (O'Dowd).

11. Systematisation of political geography, questioning of bordering categories, solution of societal problems through reflective learning processes, etc.

12. Polonia: M. Okolski, 'Illegality of International Population Movements in Poland', *International Migration*, Special Issue 1/2000 'Perspectives on Trafficking of Migrants' 38/3 (2000) pp. 57–89; 'Hungary, Poland and Ukraine'; Laczko and Thompson, *Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe: A Review of the Evidence with Case Studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine* (Geneva: International Organisation for Migration 2000).

Ukraine: G. Uehling, 'Irregular and Illegal Migration Through Ukraine', *International Migration* 42/3 (2004) pp. 77–109; Russia: V. Kolossov, 'The Political Geography of European Minorities: Past and Future', *Political Geography* 17/5 (1997) pp. 517–534.

13. Or to use Donnan and Wilson's terminology, we are looking at both symbolic and state boundaries. See H. Donnan and T.M. Wilson, 'Nation, State, and Identity at International Borders', in T.M. Wilson and H. Donnan (eds.), *Border Identities, Nation and State at International Frontiers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) pp. 1–30. To distinguish between the two I use literal to refer to actual state 'borders', while conceptual ones are denoted as 'boundaries'. When speaking of conceptual boundaries, we are not looking at the symbolic significance of the geographical state boundaries, but at other markers such as ethnicity or language which, with the rise of the new post-socialist states, need to be considered alongside these physical/literal boundaries.

14. Van Houtum, 'The Geopolitics of Borders' (note 9).

15. J. Minghi, 'Boundary Studies in Political Geography', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 53 (1963) pp. 407–428.

16. J. R. V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (Boston: Allen & Unwin 1987) pp. 58–135.

17. W. Kymlicka, 'Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective', in D. Miller and S. H. Hasmi (eds.), *Boundaries and Justice. Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2001).

18. M. Rösler and T. Wendl (eds.), *Frontiers and Borderlands – Anthropological Perspectives* (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang 1999) p. 240

19. W. Thomas and D. Hasting (eds.), *Border Identities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998).

20. F. Ratzel, *Politische Geographie oder die Staaten, der Verkehrs unde des Krieges* (Munich: Oldenbourg 1903) p. 266. Ratzel defines the difference between good natural borders and political borders by recurring to polarity: correct borders and incorrect borders.

21. G. Anzaldúa, *Borderlands. La Frontera* (San Francisco: Spinters/Aunt Lute 1987). The author's defence of a thesis that border is a third space has nourished a truly new orthodoxy in studies on the issue. It has been criticised in recent years for its aestheticism. Meanwhile, Z. Bauman (2006) offers border as a third element within the cultural diversity and unity of the human species. Border is exclusive, but also constructive.

22. Within the EU context, and by extension to Europe, the term 'frontier' brings up five distinct realities: geopolitical, legal, institutional, transactional, and politico-cultural. See M. Smith, 'The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34 (1996).

23. B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf 1991).

For Buzan the security of human collectives is affected by five factors: military, political, economic, social and environmental.

24. B. Buzan, O. Weaver, and J. De Wilder, *Security: A new Framework for Analysis* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 1998).

25. R. Kjellen, *Grundriss zu einem System der Politik* (Leipzig: Politik 1920) pp. 64–65.
26. After the fall of the dictatorships, a fury of migration was unleashed in Eastern Europe that converted Romania into the greatest contributor to immigration flows towards the West, especially since 2002 and the opening up to Romania of the border with the Schengen area.
27. Romania's progress towards the EU began in 1991 with the signing of the Association Agreement. After the signing of the Copenhagen Criteria (political, economic, and community values) (1993) at the Helsinki Summit of the European Commission (1999), the beginning of negotiations between the EU and Romania was decided along with those of other countries such as Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Malta, and Cyprus. The negotiations in the case of Romania continued into 2005 when the country's entry to the EU was decided. The signing of the Treaty of NATO Adhesion took place in April 2005 and de facto entry occurred on 1 January 2007. Since 2004, Romania has been a member of the NATO Atlantic Alliance.
28. S. Marcu, *El Mar Negro. Geopolítica de una región encrucijada de caminos* (Valladolid: Servicio de Publicaciones Universidad de Valladolid, 2007) pp. 192–202.
29. During World War I, Bessarabia (currently Moldova) came under the control of Romania in 1918. Romania lost it in 1940 to the Soviet Union which in 1947 divided it between Ukraine and the territory which has since become the Republic of Moldova – an area that was industrialised and which attracted many thousands of citizens from Russia and other Republics of the USSR.
30. R. Asmus and B. Jackson, 'The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom. Towards a New Euro-Atlantic Strategy', *Policy Review* (Hoover Institution Washington DC) 25 (June–July 2004).
31. Z. Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner 1989).
32. M. Emerson, *Redrawing the Map of Europe* (London: St. Martin's Press, Macmillan 1998) p. 118.
33. M. Light, S. White, and J. Löwenhardt, 'A Wider Europe: The View from Moscow and Kiev', *International Affairs* 76/1 (2000) p. 77.
34. There are seven points of border crossings established between Romania and Moldova: Stinca-Costesti, Sculeni-Sculeni, Ungheni-Ungheni, Albita-Leuseni, Falciu-Stoianovca, Oancea-Cahul and Galati-Giurgulesti.
35. I. Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995) ch. 2.
36. A. Golopentia, 'Populatia teritoriilor românești desprins în 1940', *Geopolitica și geoistoria: Revista română pentru sud-estul european* 3 (1941) p. 4; 'Basarabia și Bucovina de Nord, 1939–1940: Documente', *Basarabia* 6 (1991) p. 54.
37. I. Nistor, *Istoria Bucovinei* (Bucharest: Humanitas 1991) p. 312.
38. The non-aggression treaty also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed by Nazi Germany and the USSR in Moscow by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Foreign Minister Viacheslav Molotov, respectively. It was signed in 1939, shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War.
39. V. Spinei, *Spatiu Nord-Est carpatic în milenii întinse* [The North-Eastern Carpathian Space in the Dark Ages] (Iasi: Polirom 1997).
40. A. Wilson, 'The Ukrainians: Engaging the 'Eastern Diaspora'', in Charles King and Neil J. Melvin (eds.), *Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union* (Boulder: Westview 1998) p. 119.
41. W. R. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
42. D. Newman, 'On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework', *Journal of Borderland Studies* 18/1 (2003) pp. 13–24.
43. T. Diez, S. Stetter, and M. Albert, 'The European Union and the Transformation of Border Conflicts: Theorising the Impact of Integration and Association', Paper for presentation at the International Workshop on Europe's Borders, Europe in the World Centre, Liverpool, 1–2 July 2004.
44. Newman, 'On Borders and Power' (note 42).
45. H. Van Houtum, 'Borders, Strangers, Doors and Bridges', *Space and Polity* 6/2 (2002) pp. 141–146; D. Newman, 'The Lines' (note 8).
46. The border between Romania and the USSR was established and regulated by: the Treaty of Paris signed on 10 February 1947, the Treaty on border controls signed at Moscow on 25 November 1945, and the Convention on the regulation of border conflicts and incidents signed on 25 November 1949.

47. Romania wanted to sign a “fraternity” treaty that would speak of the existence of two Romanian countries, would denounce and condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and that would be written in the Romanian language. For Moldova, a treaty that would under these conditions assail the very idea of Moldovan statehood and independence.

48. ‘Moldova and Ukraine Reached a Decision on the Beginning of a Border Demarcation’, 6 March 2002, available at <<http://part.org.ua>> (in Russian).

49. N. Belitser, *Conflicting Security Concerns Across the Ukraine-Moldova Border – New Borders in South-Eastern Europe and Their Impact on the Stability in the Region of Central European Initiative (CEI)* (Chisinau: Institute for Public Policy 2002).

50. Newman, ‘The Lines’ (note 8) p. 148.

51. D. Newman, ‘World Society, Globalization and a Borderless World. The Contemporary Significance of Borders and Territory’, *World Society*, Focus Paper Series (Zurich: World Society Foundation 2005) p. 14.

52. B. Simmons, ‘Trade and Territorial Conflict: International Borders as Institutions’, M Kahler and B. Walters (ed.), *Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006).

53. The plan on the part of the Ukrainian authorities to transform a rock that lacks potable water sources into a habitable place is surprising, and it is hardly credible that a bit of land of 20.5 hectares will be able to sustain the projects contemplated by Kiev. A bank and a post office have already been built, a hotel is under construction, and at present a cinema is being planned (‘*Segodnia*, 15 Jan. 2008). Kiev is undertaking all of these efforts in order to demonstrate that Snake Island is an inhabitable place with its own social and economic life, which could prove to be an advantage over Romania.

54. P. D’Anieri, R. Kravchuk, and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine* (Boulder: Westview Press 1999) p. 225.

55. ‘Procesul Insula Serpilor continua la Haga’, *Ziua*, 4 Sep. 2008, available at <www.ziua.ro>.

56. Since 2003, Ukraine has been building a canal in the Danube Delta. This is because the Sulina branch hinders the navigation of its ships.

57. H. Mackinder, ‘Geographical Pivot of History’, *Geographical Journal* (New York 1919) pp. 78–79. In 1904, he formulated his most provocative essay ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ in which he uses history to demonstrate the geographical importance of geography.

58. H. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction* (London: Constable and Company 1919).

59. H. Mackinder, ‘The Round World and the Winning of the Peace’, *Foreign Affairs* 21/4 (1943) pp. 595–605.

60. Newman, ‘Borders and Bordering’ (note 9) p. 178.

61. I. Chambers, *Culture After Humanism: History, Culture, Subjectivity* (London: Routledge 2001) p. 208.

62. E. Balibar, ‘The Borders of Europe’, *Politics and the Other Scene* (London: Verso 2002) pp. 87–103.

63. H. Van Houtum and R. Pijpers, ‘The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-Faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU’, *Antipode* (2007) pp. 291–309.

64. P. Andreas and T. Snyder (eds.), *The Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 2000); C. Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud, ‘Control Human Trafficking, Information Campaigns, and Strategies of Migration’, *American Behavioral Scientist* 50/12 (Aug. 2007) pp. 1674–1695; F. Laczko, A. Kiekowski, and J. Barthel, ‘Trafficking in from Central and Eastern Europe: A Review of Statistical Data’, in *New Challenges for Migration Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*, rev. ed. (The Hague: Asser Press 2002).

65. M. Jandl, ‘Irregular Migration, Human Smuggling, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union’, *International Migration Review* 41/2 (Summer 2007) pp. 291–315 (293).

66. Annual Report 2007, Romanian Border Police, available at <www.politiadefrontiera.ro>.

67. Romania wanted to sign a “fraternity” treaty that would speak of the existence of two Romanian countries, denounce and condemn the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and be written in the Romanian language. For Moldova, a treaty under these conditions would assail the very idea of Moldovan statehood and independence.

68. The Schengen Agreement, which was signed on 14 June 1985 by Germany, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, has as its goal the progressive elimination of controls at common borders and the establishment of a regime of free movement for all the nationals of the

signatory States, of other States of the Community, or of third countries. The Schengen Convention completes the Agreement and defines the conditions and guarantees for the application of free movement of persons. This Convention, signed on 19 June 1990 by the Member States did not go into effect until 1995.

69. Romania has signed agreements with Austria, Benelux, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland, and is in negotiations with Portugal, Finland, Denmark, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, China, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Turkey, Latvia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Iran.

70. The return policy approved by the European Parliament in June 2008 includes, among others, the following measures: return, detention, internment order, the possibility of re-entry, and arrest.

71. I. Badescu, *Tratat de Geopolitica* (Bucharest: Ed. Mica Valahie 2004).

72. 1. The Protocol was signed by the Ministry of Interior of Romania and the State Committee for Borders of Ukraine (24 September 2006).

2. The Convention was signed by the Government of Romania and the Government of Ukraine on the simplified state border crossing by citizens who live in provinces and zones along the border (Izmajil, 29 March 1996).

3. Accord was signed by the Government of Romania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on mutual travel by citizens (Kiev, 19 December 2003).

73. On the border situated between Siret-Porubnoe it is expected that there will be an increase in smugglers on the part of Ukraine, as was the case with Romania in 2005. Romanian Border Police, <www.politiadefrontiera.ro>.

74. M. Aydin, 'Europe's Next Shore: the Black Sea Region After Enlargement', *Occasional Papers* 53 (June 2004).

75. We point out the case of the border point situated at the village of Palanca, the nature of which could endanger the internal stability of Moldova. According to the treaty signed by both countries in 1999, the Republic of Moldova transfers to the control of Ukraine the sector of the Odessa-Reni highway corresponding to the area of Palanca within the Republic of Moldova, as well as the railway sector. The sector is under the jurisdiction of Ukraine.

76. Euro-regions are types of cross-border structures. Although they cannot be considered legal entities or organisations, they share the following characteristics: they are permanent in character, they have an identity distinct from the participating members, and they have administrative, technical, and financial resources of their own.

77. The Prutul de Sus (Upper Prut) Euro-region was created in 2000. It consists the provinces of Bălți and Edineț of the Republic of Moldova, Botoșani and Suceava of Rumania, and Cernăuți of Ukraine.

78. The Lower Danube Euro-region was created in 1998 and consists of the Romanian provinces of Galați, Brăila and Tulcea, the Moldovan province of Cahul, and the region of Odessa in Ukraine.

79. E. Balibar, *We the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship* (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2004) p. 219; D. Rumley and J. Minghi (eds.), *The Geography of Border Landscapes* (London: Landscapes Routledge 1991).

80. Newman, 'The Lines' (note 8) p. 151.